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We apply a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effects of offering monetary 
grants conditional on the school’s achievements. We use the evidence of 5th-grade elementary 
schools that received extra resources for the 2013 edition of the Escola Nota Dez prize, program 
implemented in the Brazilian state Ceará that yearly gives monetary grants to the best schools and 
worst public schools according to their rank in a standardized index. Although the atmosphere of 
competition and motivation created by the prize may impact positively the whole Ceará’s school 
network, as demonstrated by previous papers, our results indicate that the extra money offered as 
award and support is not effective to improve schools’ proficiencies in state and national 
evaluations when compared to other schools in Ceará. 
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1. Introduction  
This work project examines the innovative intervention Escola Nota Dez prize instituted in the 
Brazilian state Ceará. This project offers monetary grants to the best and worst public schools 
according to the classification in a standardized exam applied yearly to all the schools in the state. 
The literal translation for the name Escola Nota Dez would be “School Grade Ten”, referring to 
the maximum grade in the Brazilian 0-10 grade system, as a suggestion of the main objective of 
the program of improving schools’ performance in terms of literacy. 
We apply the evidence of Escola Nota Dez to address the question related to the effectiveness 
of offering extra resources to schools as an instrument of public policy in education. The economic 
context where financial income is crucial for individuals and companies to succeed leads 
policymakers and other agents to believe and act based on the preconceived idea that investing 
more resources will always contribute to achieving better outcomes. The truth is this relationship 
is not so clear in some public policy matters and education is one of them, as we discuss later in 
the literature review. Certainly, this is an important question to answer since resources are limited, 
especially in developing countries, those more in need to accomplish improved results in education. 
Although the Escola Nota Dez prize was created in 2009 for the 2nd-grade elementary schools, 
our analysis will focus on the 2013 edition of the intervention for the 5th grade, which was 
implemented in 2011. Every year, the program ranks Ceará’s schools based on the IDE (from the 
Portuguese term “Índice de Desempenho Escolar”, which means “School Performance Indicator”), 
and up to 150 schools with the highest IDE-5 (IDE for the 5th grade) receive a monetary grant as 
an award for their performance if they achieve more than 7.5 and comply with some eligibility 
rules. Alongside, the same number of eligible schools with the lowest grades in the IDE receive 
monetary grants as financial support. The structure of the Escola Nota Dez prize where the 
allocation of the treatment is based on a clear cutoff in an assignment variable allows the 
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investigation of the causal effects of the extra resources on the schools’ performance by a valuable 
quasi-experimental method of policy evaluation, the Regression Discontinuity Design. As 
presented by Lee and Lemieux (2010), the regression discontinuity design is credible, transparent, 
and widely applicable, with lighter assumptions and stronger inferences when compared to other 
non-experimental approaches. 
Some authors have compared schools in Ceará with similar schools in other Brazilian states, 
concluding for a positive effect of education policies in Ceará. I will focus on a comparison between 
Ceará schools, those that receive a monetary grant versus those that didn’t receive it, and thus, I 
will be analyzing the specific effect of a monetary grant on schools’ performance. My results don’t 
speak about the overall effect of education policies in Ceará. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the context and 
structure of the Escola Nota Dez prize. Section 3 reviews the literature on the impact of extra 
resources on education as well as previous research related to Escola Nota Dez. Section 4 
introduces the data structure of our estimation. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy. Section 
6 presents the main results, and Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes. 
2. Escola Nota Dez Prize 
The Brazilian state Ceará is an interesting case of success regarding primary education. Located 
in northeast Brazil, Ceará has approximately 9.1 million inhabitants (in 2019), the 8th largest 
population among the 27 Brazilian states, around 45% of those are living in the metropolitan area 
of the capital, Fortaleza. Although Ceará has historically suffered from problems related to drought 
and poverty, the state has attracted national and international acknowledgment for the good results 
of its private and public schools in national evaluations. Taking, for example, the performance on 
IDEB (Basic Education Development Index), the main indicator for public basic education in 
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Brazil, Ceará stood out nationally in 2017 for achieving 6.1 (in the Brazilian 0-10 grade scale) for 
initial years of Elementary school, accomplishing the national goal for 2021 of 6.0. Even more 
impressive is the number of 82 schools out of the 100-best ranked in IDEB 2017 is from Ceará.  
Recent research highlights the Escola Nota Dez prize as an important contribution to Ceará’s 
improvement in education, being part of a set of policies implemented by the state department of 
education of Ceará called PAIC (an acronym for “Programa Alfabetização na Idade Certa”, which 
means Literacy at the Right Age Program). The PAIC is an example of a school accountability 
initiative since its main intervention is the establishment of clear goals of educational indicators to 
be achieved by municipalities and schools. The Escola Nota Dez award is the major incentive 
instrument of the PAIC, providing competition and cooperation between schools and 
municipalities, as well as monetary resources as tools to encourage and support educational 
improvements. 
The Escola Nota Dez was instituted in 2009 focusing exclusively on the results of the 2nd grade 
at the beginning, but it was reformulated in 2011 to include 5th grade and then in 2015 to include 
9th grade as well. The program provides financial and pedagogical support to the best and worst 
public schools according to the School Performance Indicator – referred to as IDE (from 
Portuguese term “Índice de Desempenho Escolar”). 
The IDE is a 0 -10 score calculated based on the proficiencies in Portuguese and Math from 
SPAECE (1) – Portuguese acronym for Basic Education Permanent Evaluation System of Ceará, 
a census and external evaluation promoted every year since 1992 for students on 2nd, 5th and 9th 
grade of public elementary schools. However, the Escola Nota Dez uses, in fact, the IDE-Alfa, 
IDE-5, and IDE-9, the indicators for 2nd, 5th and 9th grade respectively, computed using the 
SPAECE grades, the percentage of participation in the exam and an adjustment factor for universal 
learning at the respective grade. Those components are strategically included to discourage schools 
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from informally select students to improve performance. Appendix A offers more details of the 
IDE calculation. 
The Escola Nota Dez Prize rewards each year up to 150 public schools on each of the three 
grades considered with the better performance in the IDE with 2 000.00 BRL per number of 
students evaluated. As there are some eligibility rules to receive the prize, the number of awarded 
schools might be lower than 150, which is the case of the 2013 edition, when only 95 schools were 
awarded for the 5th grade (the grade focused in this paper). As conditions to be awarded, schools 
should obtain IDE-5 higher than 7.5, besides having at least 20 students enrolled in 5th grade and 
at least 90% of those students evaluated on SPAECE and being part of municipality where at least 
70% of students are in the “desirable” level of literacy (the levels of classification for literacy are 
Illiterate, Incomplete Literacy, Intermediate, Satisfactory and Desirable).  Besides, the schools 
cannot have received an award in the previous year, which means schools awarded in 2012 were 
not eligible for the prize in 2013. 
On the other hand, the Escola Nota Dez also offers financial support of 1 000.00 BRL for each 
student evaluated to the schools with the lowest IDE-5, in the same number of the awarded ones. 
Thus, 95 schools were supported for the 2013 edition of the prize. As a condition to receive support, 
schools need to have at least 20 students enrolled in 5th grade and at least 90% of those students 
evaluated on SPAECE and cannot have received support in the previous year. 
Another dimension of the Escola Nota Dez prize is that each awarded school is matched to a 
supported one and the pair should work together in pedagogical-technical cooperation for the 
following 2 years focusing on exchanging practices and improving their achievement. However, 
we do not consider this aspect in our analysis since the absence of information about visits and 
activities developed by the partnership makes it hard to distinguish the pairs where the 
collaboration happened from the others where it did not.  
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It is important to mention that the financial monetary grant is delivered in two installments. For 
the best schools, the monetary prize is given in the first installment of 75% of the total prize one 
year after the evaluation and the remaining 25% 2 years later, depending on the proof of the 
pedagogical partnership, the maintenance or improvement on their IDE performance, the 
achievement of a minimum IDE by the supported school of the pair, which is 5.0 on IDE-5, and 
the proper accountability of the first payment. For the supported schools, the resources are provided 
in installments of 50% each, being the second part conditional to the execution of the cooperation, 
the achievement of minimum 5.0 on IDE-5, and proper accountability of the first payment. Table 
1 is presented for a better understanding of Escola Nota Dez’s timeline.  
 
Every year, the Brazilian Ministry of Education (MEC) publicizes a minimal value per student 
that must be invested by the states in Basic Education. This minimal cost per student is a good 
benchmark to show how the financial value per student, the award of 2000 BRL, and financial 
support of 1000 BRL, offered by Escola Nota Dez prize is indeed very attractive. Table 2 shows 
this relationship, where we can see that schools that received the 1st installment of the award in 
2014 would have 66% more money in comparison to the value determined nationally, and 88% 
more if they received the 2nd installment as well. Considering financial support, it would be 22% 
extra money to be spent by the school, and 44% if they obtain both parts of the payment.  
















Notes: Free translation from "Accountability in education: impacts of the escola nota dez award on ceará s public education system"(CORREA, 2018)
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The financial fund received by the schools should be invested exclusively in their didactic-
pedagogical and human resources, equipment, and facilities. The state educational department 
determines the maximum percentage of 1st and 2nd payment for awarded and supported schools 
that should be spent in each of three components: gratification of professors and other professionals 
responsible for the learning of the grade in the year evaluated (item I); acquisition of features that 
contribute to improving quality of teaching and learning (item II) and development of the Technical 
Pedagogical Cooperation (item III). Table 3 shows the respective percentages  
 
3. Literature Review 
There is no consensus in the literature about the effects of monetary transfers in educational 
achievements. The skepticism about the relationship between financial resources and student 
achievement is present in Hanushek (2008), where the author argues that only around a quarter of 
the literature studying this question have shown positive and significant effects. Furthermore, he 
1st installment 2nd installment 1st installment 2nd installment
I Gratification of professors and other professionals 20% 30% 0% 30%
II Features to improve education and student learning 70% 100% 90% 100%
III Technical Pedagogical Cooperation 10% 0% 10% 0%
Award Support
Table 3: Maximum spending by component
Notes: Author's Elaboration. Source: "Manual de orientações para elaboração, execução e prestação de contas do plano de aplicação 
dos recursos financeiros do prêmio escola nota dez" (SEDUC, 2015)
Year Minimal Value
Both parts Only 1st part Both parts Only 1st part
2011 1 729.28 BRL 116% 87% 58% 29%
2012 2 091.37 BRL 96% 72% 48% 24%
2013 2 022.51 BRL 99% 74% 49% 25%
2014 2 285.57 BRL 88% 66% 44% 22%
2015 2 545.31 BRL 79% 59% 39% 20%
2016 2 739.00 BRL 73% 55% 37% 18%
2017 2 875.03 BRL 70% 52% 35% 17%
Table 2: Financial Award/Support as percentage of Minimal National Value
Award %
(2000 BRL) 
Notes: Minimal value is stipulated based on the estimated collections to FUNDEB – the national fund for maintenance 





wonders about the accuracy of those results, claiming that “studies involving pupil spending have 
tended to be the lowest-quality studies” (p.03). Hanushek already had discussed in previous studies 
(1981, 1989) how complicated estimating the impact of spending in schools can be, given the many 
possibilities of endogeneity and the difficulty to isolate this impact from other features, such as the 
family background. He also points out the complexity of the structure and incentives faced by 
decision-makers as a likely cause for this apparent inefficiency of resources on educational 
achievements. Glewwe et al. (2011) reinforce this discussion by presenting large research 
analyzing several studies published between 1990 and 2010 on how schools’ resources impact 
educational outcomes. According to the papers based on randomized trials and those considered 
by the authors as “high quality” studies, investment in school equipment such as textbooks, tables, 
chairs, computers, etc., seems to have a timid positive, not significant, or inconclusive impact on 
student learning. Similar conclusion is found by McEwan (2015), in his robust overview of 77 
randomized experiments on policies to improve primary schools in developing countries, monetary 
grant seems to have no impact on improving learning: the mean of the estimates of the four 
experiments about monetary grants to schools reviewed by McEwan is very low and statistically 
equal to zero. 
On the other hand, the latest decades brought significant advances in empirical strategies 
and better data for the research on additional resources in education (Gibbons and McNally, 2013). 
Hence, several papers are using a robust methodology (including real or quasi-experimental 
methods) presenting positive results of monetary investment or resources-related factors. A recent 
contribution to this literature is Gibbons et al. (2018). This article uses the variety of funds received 
by schools among different Local Educational Authorities (LEA) in England to analyze the impact 
of spending on the attainment of urban schools. The method used is a discontinuity regression 
design, where schools are matched by geographical location and free meals entitlement and 
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explores the discontinuity of grants on the border of the LEA. Their analysis has shown a 
significant impact of spending on urban state school’s achievement. Previously, Holmlund et al. 
(2013) aimed to answer the question “Does money matter for schools?” using this same context 
and data to estimate an Educational Production Function. They also found a consistent positive and 
significant effect of school expenditure on the achievement of primary school students in national 
tests, especially those economically disadvantaged. Yet, in the context of developing countries, 
Carneiro et al. (2015) studied the effectiveness of additional resources in education by a 
randomized experiment in a school grants program in Senegal, they found large positive impact in 
students achievements, especially for early grades and in schools that invested more in human 
resources than in physical resources for education. 
As mentioned before, regardless of the rough environment of drought and poverty, Ceará 
has been acknowledged for great achievements when it comes to education, which has motivated 
several studies in the last decades. Some of them investigate the contribution of structural reforms 
such as switching elementary schools to local administration (Neto et al., 2009) and including 
educational indicators as criteria for the transfer of state funds to municipalities (Carneiro and Irffi, 
2017). Yet, PAIC (“Literacy at the Right Age Program”) and its main incentive instrument, Escola 
Nota Dez prize, is a predominant subject in the literature, being seen by many as the major 
responsible for the notable progress of the state of Ceará in the early grades of basic education.  
Marques et al. (2009) present a picture of the context that prompted the implementation of 
PAIC in 2006. Analyzing literacy skills of 2nd-grade students from 55 municipalities in 2006, the 
authors observed that only 38% could write and 40% could read a simple text and only 33% could 
understand what they were reading. 
One of the earliest evaluations of PAIC, Lavor, and Arraes (2014), constructed a 
counterfactual trajectory for Ceará state from 2005 to 2011 balancing Prova Brasil's average score 
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and control variables of the other Brazilian states by a synthetic control approach. They found a 
large positive impact: the average Portuguese proficiency with PAIC grew 11 points, while it would 
be just 5.5 points in the counterfactual. 
PAIC was also the research object of Costa and Carnoy (2014). They used a triple 
difference-in-difference method where students of early grades treated by the project were 
compared to older students not treated by the project and to students from border states. The 
estimated impact of the program was between 0.7 and 0.1 SDs for Portuguese and 0.14 and 0.18 
SDs for Math. On the other hand, Karminski et al. (2017), focusing on the perspective of effects of 
PAIC on equity within schools, conclude that the program improved equity, especially in those 
schools with more disadvantaged students. They used difference-in-differences, using 5th-grade 
students of other northeast states as a control group, to estimate the impact of PAIC in the 
probability that a given student achieves the adequate level in Prova Brasil’s Portuguese evaluation. 
Considering the literature evaluating specifically Escola Nota Dez prize, Koslinski et al. 
(2017) do a deep analysis on the project’s first years of implementation in the 2nd grade (2009, 
2010 and 2011) as evidence on educational indicators use (IDE-Alfa in this context) for school 
accountability. They used propensity score matching and multiple regressions to estimate the 
impact on performance in SPAECE and Prova Brasil, inequality, and participation rate in external 
evaluations. They have 4 groups for comparison: matched schools for the award, matched schools 
for support, not-matched schools close to awarded schools, and not-matched schools close to 
supported ones. For the award schools, they obtained average SPAECE-Alfa higher than the 
control group in 22 points. They also had greater performance in Prova Brasil, which indicates that 
the implementation of the program for 2nd grade affects other grades – since Prova Brasil evaluates 
5th grade. Moreover, those schools matched to the awarded ones by the propensity score matching 
had higher average proficiencies than schools that were not matched but are geographically close 
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to award schools, what corroborates the hypothesis that Escola Nota Dez has also impact in the 
schools with more probability to receive the prize even if they do not, probably a result of 
accountability and competition mechanisms. Against the author’s expectation, the award reduced 
the inequality between awarded schools and their paired peers. Despite the positive findings for the 
awarded schools, the program seemed to have no impact on the supported schools.  
Carneiro (2018) also evaluated Escola Nota Dez under the point of view of school 
accountability. The analysis is based on a difference-in-difference approach (weighted in some 
baseline characteristics) where awarded and supported schools for 2nd and 5th grade are compared 
to 3 different controls groups: (i) all schools from other Brazilian states (except those with similar 
accountability programs to avoid noise); (ii) all schools from other states of Brazilian northeast 
(except those with similar accountability programs); and (iii) other schools from Ceará that were 
not awarded or supported. The outcomes variables are student flow indicators and Math and 
Portuguese proficiencies in Prova Brasil 5th grade 2007 to 2015. Considering the results for 
performance, Carneiro found that supported schools for 2nd or 5th grade had better results in Math 
and Portuguese Prova Brasil than similar schools from other states in Brazil and Northeast, but the 
performance was worse off when compared to other Ceará’s schools for both grades, which may 
be a consequence of the selection bias of the structure of the assignment for support. Regarding the 
awarded schools, even greater outcomes were found for awarded schools in 2nd and 5th grade in 
comparison to all three control groups. 
One of the most recent and thorough studies in this context, Correa (2018) discusses 
accountability in education using Escola Nota Dez Award as empirical evidence. Correa uses data 
from SPAECE and Prova Brasil to estimate the impact in the proficiencies and inequality of the 
5th-grade prize at the school level based on a Regression Discontinuity Design. A regression 
discontinuity was performed for each year from 2011 to 2014 for awarded and supported schools 
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with SPAECE grades, Prova Brasil grades, and SPAECE SDs as outcomes. Summarizing his 
results, the project had a positive impact on SPAECE and Prova Brasil proficiencies for awarded 
schools mainly in the year 0 (year of evaluation for the prize) in comparison to year -1(a year before 
of evaluation for the prize) and, for supported schools in the year 2. In the other years, the impact 
seems to be negative in the Prova Brasil for the award, and modestly positive for supported ones. 
In terms of equity, the evidence shows a negative impact on award schools in year -1 and positive 
for supported in year 2. 
Those results are in coherence with the author’s hypothesis about how the prize affects the 
school’s agents. According to Correa, Escola Nota Dez would influence the best schools in a 
moment before the prize by the effort in the competition to win the award, and the possible 
improvements in the following years could come from the award’s symbolic resources (public 
recognition of achievements might motivate them to dedicate even more) and material resources 
(investment in the school and gratification of the team might improve outcome). In parallel, the 
effects over those schools that receive support are after the compensation: their acknowledgment 
as “bad” schools may motivate them to change the condition (even though the author does not 
discard that may have a negative impact) and that good application of the resources may improve 
learning. 
4. Data Structure 
Our empirical analysis will be based on data from 4 different sources: SPAECE, Prova 
Brasil/SAEB, School Census, and SEDUC-CE publications (official information from Ceará’s 
Education Secretary). 
The SPAECE is a census and external exams promoted every year by Ceará state that 
evaluates Math and Portuguese proficiency of students on 2nd, 5th and 9th grades of public 
elementary schools. Those proficiencies are on a 0-500 scale and are used to calculate the School 
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Performance Index (IDE), 0-10 assignment variable for the Escola Nota Dez Prize. Prova Brazil 
and SAEB (National Basic Education Assessment System) are large scale diagnostic assessments 
developed by the Brazilian Education Ministry. They evaluate students in the 5th and 9th grade by 
Math and Portuguese standardized tests and socioeconomic questionnaires. Since 1990 SAEB 
examines a representative sample every two years, but the evaluation became a census (only for 
schools with more than 20 students enrolled) in 2007 with the Prova Brazil creation. Since then, 
Prova Brasil and SAEB are applied together every odd year. Brazilian School Census annually 
collects information about infrastructure, managers, classes, students, and teachers in the classroom 
of all Brazilian basic education schools. Finally, the list of awarded and supported schools by the 
Escola Nota Dez Prize is publicized yearly by the Ceará’s Education Secretary, SEDUC-CE. 
Our estimation will be focused on the awarded and supported schools for the 5th-grade 
evaluation in 2013. This choice is related to the fact that Prova Brasil is not applied for 2nd grade, 
besides, as the Escola Nota Dez program was implemented to 5th grade in 2011, the year 2013 
gives us a good set of Prova Brasil’s edition before (2007, 2009 and 2011) and after the prize (2013, 
2015 and 2017). The Math and Portuguese proficiencies in Prova Brasil and SPAECE are our 
outcomes variables. A set of descriptive variables of 2013 as well as previous proficiencies and 
previous contributions will be included as baseline characteristics. 
The original database included 4,012 schools that participated in SPAECE in 2013, between 
them 95 were awarded and 95 supported. However, it is important to consider that there are some 
conditions for the schools to be eligible for the prize: they must have at least 20 students enrolled 
in the 5th grade, at least 90% of those students must be evaluated on SPAECE and schools must 
not have received a contribution in the previous year. Besides, for receiving the award, there is an 
additional condition of being part of a municipality where at least 70% of students are in the 
“desirable” level of literacy. Applying those restrictions, we find that 1906 schools were eligible 
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for the support in 2013 and 640 schools were eligible for the award. Also, schools that were 
awarded or supported in 2014 were dropped from the dataset in our analysis, since they received 
the money in 2015 and it could compromise our estimation of the monetary grant effect on the 
schools for 2013 edition. Thus, in the end, the dataset is composed of 558 schools in the award 
sample and 1749 schools in the support sample. 
Table 4 reports the mean and standard deviation for some variables for the full data, the 
final sample for the award, and the final sample for the support.  
 
Related to the eligibility rules, we see that while in 2013 the Ceará’s schools have in average 
31 students enrolled in 5th, this number is much higher for the schools eligible for the award and 
support, which reflects the fact that only 51% of the full dataset fulfilled this condition. The 
Full data 
N = 4,012 Yes  (N = 95) No (N =   463) Yes  (N = 95) No (N = 1624) 
Number of students enrolled in 5th grade 31 47 44 44 52
(32.01) (37.72) (26.98) (27.58) (34.76)
Participation rate in SPAECE 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
% students in desirable level in the city 0.18 0.93 0.81 0.53 0.62
(0.33) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.19)
Age/grade distortion 0.30 0.17 0.25 0.34 0.28
(0.16) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Dropout rate 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Failure rate 5th grade 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.06
(0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Average Socioeconomic Index 41.56 41.31 41.12 40.96 42.41
(3.50) (2.76) (3.28) (2.36) (3.29)
Urban area 0.38 0.60 0.63 0.52 0.68
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47)
%  Male students 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.53
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
%  Brown students 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.58
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21)
% White students 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.14
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
%  Teachers with Tertiary Education 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.78
(0.26) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Notes: Author's elaboration. Table reports means and standard deviation based on data from SPAECE, Scholar Census, and SAEB.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics






participation rate is already quite high for all the schools, which may be evidence that the inclusion 
of this indicator in the calculus of IDE had worked to avoid the selection of students for the 
evaluation. The third row shows that the percentage of students in the desirable level of literacy in 
the city is a very strict condition; the sample of eligible for the award is approximately only a third 
of the number of eligible for the support. In fact, out of the 95 awarded schools in 2013, 24 of them 
come from Sobral, a city nationally recognized for the quality of the public schools. Out of the 184 
municipalities in Ceará, 37 cities had some schools receiving the award for SPAECE 2013, 47 
cities had received some support, and no city had simultaneously received award and support. 
The flow indicators suggest that the awarded schools are in average better off than the 
dataset groups in this matter: the age/grade distortion was approximately the half of the overall 
average, the dropout rate is statistically zero and the failure rate only 1% against the Ceará’s 
average of 5%. The opposite seems true for the supported ones since they higher flow indicators 
than all the other groups. Those results are somehow expected given the prize is based on 
proficiencies and they are usually found to be negatively correlated to flow indicators by the 
literature. 
The average socioeconomic index is an indicator based on the student’s answer to the SAEB 
context survey. The average socioeconomic index in the interval (40,50] is classified as medium-
low socioeconomic level (Level III), which is the case of the average level of the general Ceará’s 
schools and subgroups. At this level, students had have indicated that they have elementary goods 
and complementary goods (such as color television, paid TV, fixed and mobile telephone, internet 
access, vacuum cleaner, car, computes, etc.); they do not hire a monthly or daily maid; the monthly 
household income is between 1 and 1.5 minimum wages, and their parents (or guardians) have 
completed elementary school or are attending that level of education. 
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Furthermore, while we observe that most of the schools in Ceará were in a rural area in 
2013, more than 60% of the schools in the award sample were in urban areas. In the case of the 
supported schools, only 52% were urban. The fact that most of the eligible schools were in urban 
areas comes from the eligibility condition of at least 20 students enrolled in 5th grade, the average 
for Ceará’s rural schools is 15 enrolled students in the meantime the average for urban schools is 
56 students.  
Regarding gender and ethnicity, boys are slightly more than half of the students for all the 
datasets and around 60% identified themselves as brown, the term in Brazilian Portuguese is 
“pardo”, which is used to refer to the Brazilians with varied ethnic backgrounds. According to 
IBGE, 43.1% of the Brazilian population was identified as “Pardo” in the 2010’s national census. 
The statistics for the variable percentage of teachers with tertiary education emphasizes a 
weakness unfortunately still present in Brazil and other developing countries with low tertiary 
education rate. In 2013, the percentage of teachers with tertiary education in Ceará’s schools was 
around 72%. Although the rate was higher for the eligible ones, the averages were still below 80%, 
which is not a reasonable level in comparison, for instance, to most OECD countries where tertiary 
education is required to become a teacher (Education at a Glance 2019: OECD Indicators). 
Ultimately, it seems that there are significant differences between the award and non-
awarded schools and between supported and non-supported schools. Performing a basic test t, we 
find a significant difference at a 5% level between awarded and non-awarded only for the 
percentage of male students. However, there are significant differences at a 5% significance level 
for Average Socioeconomic Level, Urban, percentage of males, and the percentage of white 
between supported and non-supported schools. This is evidence that a simple comparison between 
both groups that receive the money transfers and those that did not would be misleading. Therefore, 
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to estimate the impact of the Escola Nota Dez’s monetary grant requires a proper empirical strategy 
as we discuss in the next section. 
5. Empirical Strategy 
We will explore the fact that the award or support of Escola Nota Dez is based on the IDE-
5 rank to estimate the impact of the monetary grants in the schools’ performance applying a 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Regression discontinuity design is a non-experimental 
evaluation arrangement that applies to a situation where treatment is determined by a threshold 
point in an observed variable, “forcing variable”. As formalized by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) 
using Rubin’s potential outcome framework, the RDD allows to estimate causal effects by using 
the results of individuals close to the cutoff point, but not in the treatment side, as counterfactual 
for those that received the intervention. The validity of this result requires continuity at the cutoff 
of all factors impacting the outcome except for the treatment assignment. In other words, the only 
difference between the left and the right of the neighborhood of the cutoff should be the assignment 
of the treatment. Applying to the Escola Dez’s context, we can estimate the causal effect of the 
monetary grant by Regression Discontinuity Design, assuming that at the cutoff value of IDE to be 
assigned for the award or support the only difference between schools would be the money 
received. When it is well-founded, RDD has a strong internal validity when compared to other 
quasi-experimental methods (Nichols, 2007; Imbens and Lemieux; 2008). However, as the 
estimates are based on the subpopulation around the cutoff, the external validity is compromised, 
and we cannot extrapolate the results to the overall average effect.  
Correa (2018) performed a parametric regression discontinuity design based on the basic 
model of Trochim (1990) to estimate the Escola Dez’s impact assuming a linear relationship 
between the posttreatment outcomes and the pretreatment assignment variable (IDE-5) and applied 
binary variables to control for the eligibility rules of each type of intervention, award or support.  
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Alternatively, we follow a distinctive approach. Firstly, as there are two groups of 
intervention with different thresholds and different eligibility conditions for the comparison 
groups, award and support treatment is analyzed separately considering the two different datasets 
with only the eligible schools for the respective intervention. In that way, all schools above the 
award threshold and no schools below the award threshold receive the money, as well as all schools 
below the support cutoff and no school above the support cutoff, receive the grant. Therefore, we 
can estimate a “sharp” regression discontinuity for both cases. In a sharp RDD, the probability of 
being treated jumps from 0 to 1 at the cutoff. The alternative option would be a fuzzy RDD, where 
there is a significant but not total jump on the probability of being treated at the cutoff. 
Furthermore, we estimate a nonparametric regression discontinuity instead of a parametric 
one. As the main limitation of the parametric design is the sensibility of the estimators for the 
choice of functional form between the outcome and treatment assignment, more recent literature 
has explored the possibility of nonparametric regression at the boundary to reduce this potential 
bias by comparing average outcome for small-enough bins of assignment variable to left and right 
of the cutoff (e.g: Hahn et al., 2001, Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009). We employ a local linear regression for the schools within the optimal bin each 
side of the threshold as described in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Fan and Gibels (1996).  We 
apply the methodological choices of Nichols (2007) both for the optimal bandwidth and kernel. 
The optimal bandwidth is estimated to minimize MSE as in Imbens and Kalyanaram (2009), and 
the triangle kernel that, as mentioned by Nichols, “has good properties in the RD context, due to 
being boundary optimal”. We test all the regressions for the bandwidth selection, as the sensibility 
of the estimators for the choice of the bandwidth is an issue of picking a nonparametric approach 
as an empirical strategy.  
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As our analysis is focused on the 2013 edition, the forcing variable is the IDE – 5 in 2013. 
The cutoff for the award is known pre-evaluation by the rules specified for the program (which is 
IDE-5 = 7.5), although this limit could be higher if more than 150 eligible schools achieve IDE 
greater than 7.5, it did not happen in 2013. On the other hand, the cutoff for the support is identified 
only after the number of awarded schools is known, based in the condition that the number of 
schools receiving the support must be the same number of schools being awarded and on the results 
of the different schools. 
A reminder of the prize structure: schools were evaluated in the SPAECE 2013; awarded 
and supported schools are identified, and 1st installment of the monetary grant is received in 2014. 
The objective is to examine the impact of the money received in the Portuguese and Math 
proficiencies in SPAECE 2015, 2016, and 2017 and Prova Brasil 2015 and 2017. We estimate 
RDD for SPAECE and Prova Brasil 2013 proficiencies as robustness tests since we would expect 
no discontinuity pretreatment. There should be no discontinuity either in SPAECE 2014, at least 
not caused by the monetary grant, given the transfer occurs almost simultaneously to the exam by 
the end of the year. However, the announcement of the awarded and support schools made in March 
could have effects on the agents’ incentives, so the estimation for SPAECE 2014 proficiencies is 
also an important robustness test.   
Although covariates are not required to obtain consistent estimates, their inclusion could 
improve precision and reduce potential bias brought by observations not close enough to the cutoff 
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), therefore we performed all the regressions with and without 
covariates, including the pre-treatment dependent variable (SPAECE 2012 and Prova Brasil 2011), 
as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2009). 
Moreover, as demonstrated in table 5, several schools have received a monetary grant 
before 2013 either for the 2nd or 5th-grade version of the prize. Receiving money for previous 
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editions of the prize could potentially influence incentives and available resources of the schools. 
Therefore, we also estimate the effects of the award and support for 5th grade controlling for the 
numbers of times schools received money for previous editions of the program (both 2nd and 5th 
grade).  
 
A concern before applying regression discontinuity design is that the only change at the 
cutoff is the assignment for the treatment. In other words, we expect no discontinuity in other 
baseline characteristics, since the only difference in the schools immediately above and below the 
threshold should be the receiving of the prize. To test for this assumption, we ran RDDs using 
covariates as outcome variables and analyzed if there was a significant jump at the cutoff on the 
award dataset and support data set. We did not find significant discontinuity in any of the regression 
as described in table 6. Appendix B presents RD graphs of the covariates on assignment variable 
(IDE) and tests for the sensibility of the bandwidth.  
Grade Nº Prizes Yes  (N = 95) No (N =   463) Yes  (N = 95) No (N = 1624) 
0 19 252 40 888
1 36 132 38 510
2 21 55 14 164
4 15 17 1 50
5 4 7 1 12
0 54 432 79 1524
1 41 31 15 100
Notes: Author's Elaboration. Number of prizes considers both classes of monetary grant (award and support). The 
Escola Nota Dez prize started for 2nd grade in 2009 and for 5th grade in 2011.
2nd
5th 
Table 5: Number of previous prizes received
Eligible Award Eligible Support 
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Another concern for the estimation may be the possibility of schools around the threshold 
manipulate their results to receive the treatment. It is hard to believe that schools could manipulate 
the IDE, given that it is calculated based on the average proficiencies of the exam result of the 
many students in the schools, then also in the participation rates and other educational indicators 
as mentioned before. Besides, the threshold for supported schools is previously unknown, and even 
for awarded schools what is known is the minimum necessary value (7.5). Manipulation would be 
even more difficult for the support ones that would necessarily jeopardize their performance to get 
the money.  We tested the manipulation assumption by comparing the density of the forcing 
variable on the left and right of the threshold, as proposed by McCrary (2008). As expected, we 
could not reject the null hypothesis of no jumps at the cutoff for both interventions (the difference 
between the frequency to the right and the left for the award dataset is 0.2 with standard errors 
equal to 0.54, and for the support dataset the difference is -0.02 and standard errors 0.13). Figure 1 
shows the distribution of IDE-5 2013 for the schools eligible for the awarded and support about 
the respective cutoff 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 1. Distribution of IDE-5 2013 in relation to the cutoff. (a) Distribution of the IDE-5 2013 for schools 
eligible for the award in relation to the award cutoff. (b) Distribution of the IDE-5 2013 for schools eligible 
for the support in relation to the support cutoff. Notes: The density function was calculated using McCrary 




Table 7 reports the causal effects of Escola Nota Dez’s prize on Math and Portuguese 
proficiencies of 5th grade SPAECE and Prova Brasil of schools that received the monetary grants 
for 5th grade in 2013. The estimations were made by local linear regression discontinuity without 
covariates, with covariates and with covariates plus controls for the previous edition of the prize. 
Those estimates for the award intervention are displayed in the columns (1), (2) and (3) and for the 
support one in the columns (4), (5) and (6).  
 
Regarding the award, there is no significant impact of the award both for Portuguese and 
Math SPAECE for any of the years, except 2014, and the results are quite consistent between the 
different approaches. For 2014, we found positive effects in the Math SPAECE grade at a 5% 
significance level and in Portuguese SPAECE grade for the estimations with controls presented in 
columns (2) and (3), but only at a 10% significance level. Considering that the resources for the 
Portuguese Math Portuguese Math Portuguese Math Portuguese Math Portuguese Math Portuguese Math
-6.74 -11.15 -5.94 -9.94 -5.80 -10.41 -5.13 -3.00 -7.49* -4.81 -7.53* -4.78
(12.90) (14.32) (11.62) (13.83) (11.59) (13.78) (4.48) (6.37) (4.22) (6.47) (4.22) (6.48)
-0.20 -4.57 2.39 -1.85 2.37 -1.93 -2.45 -0.48 -3.00 -1.38 -3.12 -1.41
(6.84) (7.36) (6.72) (7.68) (6.74) (7.72) (3.67) (4.36) (3.65) (4.29) (3.69) (4.27)
9.46 1.43 11.28 2.91 11.26 2.76 -3.85 0.94 -4.81 -0.10 -4.80 0.03
(7.90) (8.28) (7.38) (8.02) (7.32) (7.92) (4.39) (5.11) (4.44) (4.74) (4.43) (4.69)
10.37 21.13** 13.39* 22.27** 13.25* 22.09** -5.92 -4.43 -3.89 -4.21 -3.99 -4.21
(7.32) (9.47) (7.03) (9.44) (7.10) (9.23) (3.63) (4.11) (3.34) (3.80) (3.29) (3.78)
-4.48 1.91 -4.08 1.98 -4.05 1.99 -1.90 0.79 -1.65* 0.42 -1.64* 0.39
(4.03) (3.06) (3.14) (3.11) (3.14) (3.10) (0.96) (0.95) (0.96) (0.95) (0.95) (0.94)
-7.51 -10.76 10.72* 9.60 -7.11 -10.16 1.74 -2.97 0.29 -4.79 0.59 -4.25
(10.26) (13.72) (6.00) (8.12) (9.34) (11.33) (4.38) (5.18) (4.75) (5.74) (4.38) (5.20)
-14.42 -12.28 6.66 9.48 -12.21 -10.18 -0.82 2.56 -0.98 0.98 -2.07 1.72
(10.52) (11.98) (8.59) (8.64) (9.18) (10.44) (3.77) (3.59) (3.79) (3.83) (3.77) (3.53)
3.35 3.16 6.29 6.02 1.36 1.48 -2.34 0.80 0.29 3.66 0.94 4.14
(6.69) (7.53) (7.10) (7.15) (5.47) (6.58) (3.64) (4.37) (2.24) (2.74) (2.06) (2.53)
2017
2015






RD RD with covariates RD with previous 
prize controls
Award
Notes: Table reports local linear RDD coefficients and standard errors from school-level regressions using the optimal bandwidth that minimizes MSE and a 
triangle kernel distribution. (1) to (3) are the causal effects for the award.  (4) to (6) are the causal effects for the support. Except for (1) and (4), estimations 
used covariates: Average Socioeconomic Level, Urban Area, Percentage of Male, Percentage of Brown, Percentage of White, Percentage of Teachers with 
Tertiary Education and Math/ Portuguese grades in 2012 for SPAECE estimations and Math/Portuguese grades in 2011 for Prova Brasil estimations. 
Estimations (3) and (6) used previous prize control, which is the number of the prize received before 2013 considering both 2nd grade, 5th grade, award, and 
support. *Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%
2015
(1) (2) (3)








2013 edition were received by the end of 2014, these effects could not be from the monetary grant. 
A possible explanation for the impact in 2014 could be that the acknowledgment of the school as 
one of the best of the state might motivate teachers and students in the following year of the award 
announcement, although we cannot confirm this hypothesis with the available data.  The award 
seems to have no impact in Prova Brasil's proficiencies neither. Although the estimation with 
covariates suggests effect in Portuguese in 2017, the result is only significant at the 10% level and 
it is not robust compared to other estimation procedures. Appendix C shows the regression 
discontinuity graphs for the award dataset. 
Concerning the supported schools, there is no significant effect for any of the years in both 
SPAECE and Prova Brasil at a 5% significance level. Yet, at a 10% significance level, the 
estimations with covariates suggest an impact in the Portuguese SPAECE in 2013 and 2017. 
Appendix D shows the regression discontinuity graphs for the support dataset. 
Moreover, as presented in Appendix E, we test the bandwidth sensibility of the estimation 
by displaying coefficients and confidence interval for bins smaller and larger than the optimal 
bandwidth and the results are robust for bandwidth choice.  
7.  Discussion and Conclusion 
We use the evidence from the innovative Escola Nota Dez prize implemented in the 
Brazilian state Ceará to address the question of whether offering extra resources to schools is an 
effective instrument to improve their performance. Every year, this program gives monetary grants 
to the best and worst public schools according to a standardized index for 2nd, 5th, and 9th grade 
of the elementary basic education and some eligibility rules. Our analysis focused on the schools 
awarded or supported for 5th grade in 2013 and our results indicate that the monetary dimension 
of the prize had no impact on schools’ achievements in terms of proficiencies when we compared 
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schools that received extra resources to their counterfactual estimated using a sharp regression 
discontinuity approach. 
As discussed in section 3, the effectiveness of extra resources as an instrument of policy in 
education is an ongoing debate, hence the estimated absence of impact of the monetary grants is 
indeed coherent to several works in the literature, such as Hanushek (1981, 1989 and 2008) and 
Glewwe et al. (2011). Looking at the research on Escola Nota Dez, previous works had shown 
positive effects of being awarded by the Escola Nota Dez prize, and ambiguous results for being 
supported (Koslinski et al., 2017; Carneiro, 2018; Correa, 2018). However, the authors have 
examined the program as evidence of school accountability, which means they were focused on 
evaluating the whole system of standardized tests or procedures, employing criteria to determine 
whether schools perform satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily. In this sense, they did not control for the 
timeline of the prize, that is, if the schools had already received the money or not. Our results for 
the award indicate some effects on SPAECE 2014 (when they had not received any money), that 
could come from other incentives created by the prize, such as the motivation and competition. The 
RDD analysis of Correa (2018), for instance, also found a positive impact of the award in a moment 
previous of receiving the monetary grant. 
Although the monetary dimension of the prize might not be effective, the Escola Nota Dez 
is also part of a set of policies of school accountability. It is reasonable to suppose that 
accountability influences schools regardless they received or did not receive a contribution. 
Literature had shown consistently positive effects of PAIC and Escola Nota Dez when comparing 
the performance of Ceará’s schools to schools from other Brazilian states, such as Lavor and Arraes 
(2014), Costa and Carnoy (2014), Karminski et al. (2017) and Carneiro (2018). 
Our analysis did not explore how the schools allocated the money according to the 
program’s guidelines, the impact of the money being transferred in two installments or the 
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relationship with the pedagogical-technical cooperation, those are interesting questions for further 
investigation. As Hanushek (2006) remarks, even new evidence and stronger methodology are 
improbable to bring a definitive conclusion about the general effectiveness of resources, yet, it is 
valuable the learning of when and where resources are productively applied in education.  
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Appendix A: IDE calculation 
The gross IDE is calculated based on the proficiencies in Portuguese and Math from 
SPAECE (1) – Portuguese acronym for Basic Education Permanent Evaluation System of 
Ceará, a census and external evaluation promoted every year since 1992 for students on 2nd, 
5th and 9th grade of public elementary schools. Those proficiencies are on a scale from 0 – 500 
with inferior and superior limits pre-determined depending on the grade evaluated. However, 
the Escola Nota Dez uses, in fact, the IDE-Alfa, IDE-5 and IDE -9, the indicators for 2nd, 5th 
and 9th grade respectively, computed using the Gross IDE, the percentage of participation in 
the exam and an adjustment factor for universal learning (2), those components are strategically 
included to discourage schools to use a method of students selection to improve performance. 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝐷𝐸
=  𝑆𝑃𝐴𝐸𝐶𝐸 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
 𝑥 10 (1) 





Appendix B: RDD robustness tests - Baseline characteristics as outcomes 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure B.1. Award Dataset: baseline characteristics as outcomes in relation to the award cutoff. Red line for non-
awarded schools and Green line for awarded schools with the optimal bandwidth that minimize MSE and a 
triangle kernel distribution. (a) Average Socioeconomic Level (b) Percentage of White (c) Percentage of Brown 









Figure B.2 Support Dataset: baseline characteristics as outcomes in relation to the support cutoff. Notes: Red line 
for supported schools and Green line for non-supported schools with the optimal bandwidth that minimize MSE 
and a triangle kernel distribution. (a) Average Socioeconomic Level (b) Percentage of White (c) Percentage of 







(a)  (b) 
Figure B.3. Award Dataset: graph of estimates versus bandwidths for baseline characteristics as outcomes in 
relation to Award cutoff.  Notes: Estimates as red dot and 95% confidence interval as blue bracket. The vertical 
red line represents the default bandwidth.  (a) Average Socioeconomic Level (b) Percentage of White (c) 








(a)  (b) 
Figure B.4. Support Dataset: graph of estimates versus bandwidths for baseline characteristics as outcomes in 
relation to Support cutoff. Notes: Estimates as red dots and 95% confidence interval as blue brackets. The vertical 
red line represents the default bandwidth.  (a) Average Socioeconomic Level (b) Percentage of White (c) 


















Figure C.1. Award – Regression Discontinuity graphs with SPAECE proficiencies as outcomes. Red line for non-
awarded schools and Green line for awarded schools with the optimal bandwidth that minimize MSE and a 
triangle kernel distribution (a) Portuguese 2013 (b) Math 2013 (c) Portuguese 2014 (d) Math 2014 (e) Portuguese 








Figure C.2. Award – Regression Discontinuity graphs with Prova Brasil proficiencies as outcomes. Red line for 
non-awarded schools and Green line for awarded schools with the optimal bandwidth that minimize MSE and a 
triangle kernel distribution (a) Portuguese 2013 (b) Math 2013 (c) Portuguese 2015 (d) Math 2015 (e) Portuguese 

















Figure D.1 Support – Regression Discontinuity graphs with SPAECE proficiencies as outcomes. Red line for non-
awarded schools and Red line for supported schools and Green line for non-supported schools with the optimal 
bandwidth that minimize MSE and a triangle kernel distribution. (a) Portuguese 2013 (b) Math 2013 (c) 
Portuguese 2014 (d) Math 2014 (e) Portuguese 2015 (f) Math 2015 (g) Portuguese 2016 (h) Math 2016 (i) 








Figure D.2. Support – Regression Discontinuity graphs with Prova Brasil proficiencies as outcomes Red line for 
supported schools and Green line for non-supported schools with the optimal bandwidth that minimize MSE and 
a triangle kernel distribution. (a) Portuguese 2013 (b) Math 2013 (c) Portuguese 2015 (d) Math 2015 (e) 






Appendix E: Bandwidth Sensibility Tests  
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